# RMP-RESP-002 Choking or blocked airway: bring kit, steady the scene; airway care by crew
# Version 0.3 (Draft). CONCEPTUAL. NOT FOR CLINICAL USE.
# Space Medicine Foundation robot-readable protocol library. Format: https://spacemedicinefoundation.org/robotic-medicine/protocols/schema/
# Every threshold marked <set by ...> must be set by the named owner (see the schema) before any use.
schema_version: '0.3'
version: '0.3'
status: draft
conceptual: true
not_for_clinical_use: true
max_autonomy: 2
missions:
- leo
- commercial
- moon
- mars
updated: '2026-10-21'
review:
  state: reviewed-ai-assisted
  requested: '2026-10-21'
  reviewed: '2026-10-21'
  human_clinician_review: false
  text: >-
    AI-assisted clinical and source review by the Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026 (batch 5 review,
    25 required corrections and 18 optional suggestions); all required corrections, and the low-risk editorial
    suggestions, are applied in this version (see Corrections). No named human clinician has reviewed
    it. Not for clinical use.
fixed_rules:
  flight_surgeon_is_medical_authority: true
  cmo_acts_under_delegated_care: true
  human_starts_and_restarts_robot: true
  robot_never_diagnoses: true
  no_drug_or_fluid_advice_by_robot: true
  safe_state_on_fault_or_no_response: true
  lost_link_pause_then_cmo_decides: true
robot_lockouts:
  diagnosis: true
  drug_or_fluid_advice: true
  starting_stopping_or_adjusting_oxygen_or_any_medicine: true
  self_start_or_self_restart: true
  changing_own_protocol_thresholds_or_limits: true
  handing_over_a_mismatched_item_as_verified: true
id: RMP-RESP-002
slug: rmp-resp-002
title: 'Choking or blocked airway: bring kit, steady the scene; airway care by crew'
category: resp
tier: 1
rung_note: >-
  Max rung raised from 1 to 2 for supervised fetching and scene support. The robot never performs back
  blows, abdominal thrusts, finger sweeps or any airway procedure.
result_language:
  use:
  - logged, not interpreted
  - sent to flight surgeon
  - EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (CMO command)
  - as stated by the CMO
  never:
  - normal
  - no problem found
  - all clear
  - negative
  - any diagnosis or cause
  - mild choking
  - severe choking
  - cleared
  - obstruction gone
  - verified
  - safe
  - mild
  - minor
scope:
  summary: >-
    When a crewmember is choking or has a blocked airway, the robot sends an URGENT alert at once, brings
    the airway / emergency kit on command, clears space, records the clock times of back blows, abdominal
    thrusts and any transition to CPR as the CMO states them, and streams video when the link allows.
    The crew assess severity and give all airway care under the onboard checklist and Resuscitation Council
    UK adult choking algorithm as Earth context. The robot never strikes the back, thrusts the abdomen,
    sweeps the mouth or starts oxygen.
  why: >-
    NASA records list 3 choking or obstructed-airway events among US astronauts through 2006 (in-flight
    medical conditions evidence report). On Earth, the Resuscitation Council UK adult choking algorithm
    splits mild obstruction (effective cough: encourage cough) from severe obstruction (ineffective cough:
    5 back blows then 5 abdominal thrusts if conscious; CPR if unconscious). A loose crown or tooth fragment
    can be inhaled (see RMP-ENT-002). A helper that alerts, fetches the sealed kit and keeps the scene
    clear lets the CMO act at once. Design judgment: Earth abdominal thrusts assume a stable torso. In
    weightlessness the onboard checklist should name a restrained method (for example a foot restraint
    or bracing against structure), or chest thrusts if the checklist prefers them; no public spaceflight
    choking algorithm was found. The robot does not choose or teach the method.
  covers:
  - Choking, ineffective cough, or suspected inhaled foreign body with breathing difficulty, in flight
  - Transition to RMP-CARD-001 if the crewmember becomes unresponsive
  locked_out:
  - Back blows, abdominal or chest thrusts, finger sweeps, or any contact with the patient
  - Opening the kit or giving any medicine
  - Starting or adjusting oxygen
  - Saying the airway is clear or that choking is mild
  - Asking the choking person to walk toward the robot
  related:
  - RMP-CARD-001
  - RMP-RESP-001
  - RMP-RESP-003
  - RMP-ENT-002
  - RMP-PHARM-001
  - RMP-NEURO-001
roles:
  medical_authority: Flight surgeon (ground). Holds medical authority for every run.
  onboard_lead: >-
    Crew medical officer (CMO), acting under delegated care; uses the pre-approved onboard checklist when
    there is no link.
  others:
  - 'Second trained CMO: helps or takes over if the CMO is the patient'
  - 'Other crew: help restrain the patient as the CMO directs'
  robot_may:
  - Send an URGENT alert at once
  - Bring the sealed airway or emergency kit on command
  - Clear space and hold position clear of the CMO
  - Stream video when the link allows
  - Record clock times as the CMO states them
  - Reconcile the kit after the event through RMP-PHARM-001 as an inventory record only
  robot_may_not:
  - Touch the patient or perform any airway manoeuvre
  - Open the kit or start oxygen
  - Say the obstruction is mild or cleared
  - Start without a human command
  commercial: >-
    On commercial flights, 'flight surgeon' and 'CMO' mean the operator's designated medical authority
    and trained onboard responder. If no trained responder is aboard, this protocol is not used. (NASA-STD-3001
    requires two CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs [V1 3006]; FAA rules set no medical standards for
    spaceflight participants.)
preconditions:
- id: PRE-1
  text: A crewmember or the CMO started the protocol by command.
  check: human_start == true
  refs:
  - V2 10174
- id: PRE-2
  text: Robot self-test passed; kit stowage location known.
  refs:
  - V2 10161
  - V2 7059
- id: PRE-3
  text: Robot and supplies restrained when not moving.
  refs:
  - V2 7046
- id: PRE-4
  text: Link status known. The CMO never waits for the robot before treating.
  check: link_state in [live, delayed, down]
consent:
  standard: Emergency care; recording by the CMO's agreement when the patient cannot speak.
  emergency: If the patient cannot agree, the robot proceeds on the CMO's command.
  withdrawal: The CMO can stop video; the alert and record stand.
inputs:
- id: IN-1
  name: 'CMO or crew statement: choking, ineffective cough, or suspected inhaled object'
  source: Voice
  required: true
  if_missing: Log "no response"; keep URGENT alert.
- id: IN-2
  name: >-
    Effective vs ineffective cough, consciousness, and times of back blows or thrusts, as stated by the
    CMO
  source: CMO
  required: false
  if_missing: Log "not stated".
- id: IN-3
  name: Link status and delay
  source: Communications system
  required: true
  if_missing: Treat as link down.
steps:
- id: S1
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    On a crewmember's or the CMO's word, send an URGENT "choking / blocked airway" alert to the flight
    surgeon and the CMO at once. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same
    time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating,
    or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight
    [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated
    and sent to the next named crewmember.
  success: Alert acknowledged, or escalated.
  refs:
  - V2 10174
  - V1 6003
  - V1 3006
- id: S2
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    On the CMO's command, bring the sealed airway or emergency kit to the CMO at once and restrain it
    within reach. This is an emergency fetch on a human command (CMO): no barcode check runs before hand-over
    and nothing waits for one. The robot reads the kit's own label and seal status only if that adds no
    delay, says "EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (CMO command)", and "seal not intact" if so, and hands
    the kit over anyway. The fetch is logged as an override: time, who asked, the reason as stated, kit
    ID and seal status. It never says "verified".
  success: Kit within reach, or skipped; override logged.
  limit: <set by validation>
  refs:
  - V2 7046
- id: S3
  actor: crew
  action: >-
    The CMO assesses severity and treats under the onboard checklist, which names a restrained thrust
    method for weightlessness (design judgment). Checklist context for the CMO only (Earth RCUK adult
    choking algorithm): encourage cough if effective; back blows and abdominal thrusts if conscious with
    ineffective cough; CPR if unconscious. The robot never demonstrates, counts or coaches blows or thrusts,
    and stays clear.
  success: Human-led care; robot logs what is stated.
  refs:
  - V1 3004
- id: S4
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    Clear loose items, hold clear of the CMO, stream video when the link allows unless the CMO stops it,
    and log each stated manoeuvre on a clock-time timeline.
  success: Space clear; times logged.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
- id: S5
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    After any URGENT alert: After an URGENT alert the robot does not leave on its own: it stays at its
    rest position in the module, with its screen and voice link available, until a human has taken over
    or tells it to go. It never follows, blocks or touches anyone. It keeps time-stamping what humans
    say they did, and repeats the alert if it is not acknowledged.
  success: Robot at rest in the module until a human releases it; alert acknowledged or escalated.
  refs:
  - V2 10173
  - V1 3006
- id: S6
  actor: ground
  action: >-
    The flight surgeon (or the CMO under the onboard checklist when there is no link) decides ongoing
    airway care, imaging, and any evacuation [V1 3007].
  success: Decision logged.
  refs:
  - V1 3007
- id: S7
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    When the CMO says the event is over, run RMP-PHARM-001 reconciliation on each kit fetched: record
    the items the CMO or crew state were used, the remaining contents against the kit list, seal status
    and expiry, labelled "inventory reconciliation after emergency use – not a check before use". Flag
    the override to the flight surgeon and the pharmacy lead, and show each kit as "opened – not restocked"
    until a human restocks and reseals it.
  success: Reconciliation recorded; kit shown as opened – not restocked until resealed.
  refs:
  - V2 7059
- id: S8
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: 'Send the flight surgeon one package: alert times, stated manoeuvres, video pointer and decisions.'
  success: Package delivered or queued.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
  - V1 7001
  - V1 7003
decisions:
- id: D1
  after: S3
  decided_by: crew
  question: Has the crewmember become unresponsive?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: Start RMP-CARD-001 at once; this protocol's record continues as context.
  - if: 'No'
    then: Continue airway care under the checklist.
- id: D2
  after: S4
  decided_by: robot
  question: >-
    Checked after every answer and at any point in the run (even mid-question or mid-step): does any answer,
    reading or observation meet a red flag?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: >-
      Stop the current question or step at once and apply the action listed for each matching red flag
      (URGENT alert, flag, or stop), with the answer or reading itself, never a cause. Every URGENT alert
      goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link
      is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the
      second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not
      acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.
  - if: 'No'
    then: Continue.
- id: D3
  after: S4
  decided_by: robot
  question: Did the CMO answer when asked for a stated time?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: Continue.
  - if: Declined explicitly (the crewmember says no to a question)
    then: Log "declined" for that question only; the alert already sent stands.
  - if: No response, or the answer does not make sense
    then: >-
      URGENT: log "no response" (never "declined"); the CMO, or the second trained CMO if the CMO is the
      patient, checks the crewmember in person at once.
- id: D4
  after: S6
  decided_by: ground
  question: What is the plan (airway care, observation, evacuation)?
  branches:
  - if: Link live
    then: Flight surgeon decides; robot logs.
  - if: Link down or delay too long
    then: >-
      The CMO decides under the pre-approved onboard checklist; the flight surgeon reviews the log at
      the next contact.
stop_rules:
- id: X1
  trigger: The patient (or the crewmember being examined) says stop, or withdraws consent
  action: >-
    Robot stops all motion at once, backs away to its rest position and tells the CMO. Recording stops
    unless the patient agrees to keep it running.
  level: stop
  refs:
  - V2 10165
- id: X2
  trigger: Any crewmember presses stop or takes over control
  action: Protective stop; robot holds its stopped position; only a human may restart it.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10165
  - V2 10168
  - V2 10174
- id: X3
  trigger: Robot fault, sensor fault, or a force, speed or reach limit is reached
  action: Protective stop and hand control to the CMO; log the fault.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10172
  - V2 10168
- id: X4
  trigger: CMO is asked to take over and does not respond (for example, the CMO is the patient)
  action: Robot stays stopped; the next named crewmember is called.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10173
  - V2 7045
- id: X5
  trigger: Loss of link, or delay longer than the limit for live guidance
  action: >-
    Robot pauses its own movement in its stopped position and tells the CMO and the commander. This pauses
    robot movement only: crew back blows, thrusts, CPR and oxygen continue under the onboard checklist
    and never wait for the link or the robot. The CMO decides whether the robot continues offline under
    the pre-approved onboard checklist; the robot resumes only on the CMO's confirmation. Everything is
    logged and sent to the flight surgeon at the next contact.
  level: pause
  refs:
  - V2 10172
  - V2 10173
- id: X6
  trigger: An URGENT alert is not acknowledged within the set time
  action: >-
    Robot repeats the alert and sends it to the next named crewmember (the second trained CMO first if
    the CMO is the patient), and keeps repeating at the set interval. It stays where it is: it does not
    leave on its own.
  level: urgent
  refs:
  - V1 3006
  - V2 10173
- id: X7
  trigger: The crewmember stops responding, or seems confused or drowsy, at any point
  action: >-
    URGENT alert at once, even mid-question or mid-step; the robot stops its current task, stays at its
    rest position and does not continue the run; a crewmember checks in person.
  level: urgent
- id: X8
  trigger: A crewmember asks the robot what is wrong, or for medicine, fluid or treatment advice
  action: >-
    Robot declines, says it cannot assess or advise, and routes the question to the CMO or flight surgeon.
  level: stop
- id: X9
  trigger: The CMO needs the robot's space
  action: Robot moves to its rest position at once and holds; it does not leave the module on its own.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10172
red_flags:
- id: RF1
  sign: Ineffective cough, silent cough, inability to speak, or blue lips, as stated
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert; the CMO treats as severe obstruction under the checklist
  source: rcukchoke
- id: RF2
  sign: Unresponsive during choking
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert; start RMP-CARD-001 now
  source: rcukchoke
- id: RF3
  sign: Suspected inhaled tooth, crown or object (see RMP-ENT-002)
  threshold: any
  action: >-
    URGENT alert; the CMO checks in person now; if the crewmember becomes unresponsive, start RMP-CARD-001
    (RF2)
  source: sdceprest
- id: RF4
  sign: Wheeze or breathlessness after a possible allergic trigger
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert; see RMP-RESP-003
  source: rcuk
- id: RF5
  sign: Symptoms improve, as the CMO states
  threshold: any
  action: Flag to the flight surgeon; the CMO continues observation; the robot never says the airway is
    clear
  source: rcukchoke
safety_limits:
- id: L1
  name: Contact with the crewmember
  value: not allowed
  enforced: Keep-out zone in the robot controller
  refs:
  - V2 10172
- id: L2
  name: Airway manoeuvres by the robot
  value: not allowed
  enforced: No strike, thrust or sweep task is loaded
- id: L3
  name: Robot speed near the crewmember
  value: <set by validation>
  enforced: Hard limit in the controller
  refs:
  - V2 10172
- id: L4
  name: Closest approach to the patient and CMO
  value: <set by validation>
  enforced: Distance sensing
logs:
- id: LOG-1
  text: Every input, robot action, decision (with who made it) and hand-off, time-stamped to the second.
  refs:
  - V2 10163
  - V2 10164
- id: LOG-2
  text: Mode changes and safety-limit events are announced to the operator as they happen and logged.
  refs:
  - V2 10162
  - V2 10172
- id: LOG-3
  text: >-
    Records are stored and sent as private medical data, encrypted, with access limited to the medical
    team.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
  - V1 7003
- id: LOG-4
  text: Results are kept in a permanent, retrievable format so the flight surgeon can see trends.
  refs:
  - V1 7001
- id: LOG-5
  text: Alert time, each stated manoeuvre time, video start/stop, kit reconciliation.
- id: LOG-6
  text: >-
    Each URGENT alert, who received it, the time it was acknowledged (or the escalation to the next named
    crewmember), and the time a human released the robot.
  refs:
  - V2 10163
- id: LOG-7
  text: >-
    Each emergency fetch as an override (time, who asked, reason as stated, kit ID, seal status) and the
    later inventory reconciliation, labelled "not a check before use".
  refs:
  - V2 7059
requirements:
- id: V1 3004
  use: In-mission care includes medical kits and emergency procedures; the crew deliver airway care.
- id: V1 3006
  use: >-
    Two trained CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs; the second trained CMO receives alerts when the CMO
    is the patient (see the commercial-flight note).
- id: V1 3007
  use: Medical evacuation when needed; the flight surgeon decides.
- id: V1 6003
  use: Logs and alerts sent to the ground are private medical communications.
- id: V1 7001
  use: Records kept so the flight surgeon can see trends.
- id: V1 7003
  use: Secure handling of medical records.
- id: V2 7045
  use: Usable by non-physician crew, including when the CMO is the patient.
- id: V2 7046
  use: Patient, caregiver and supplies restrained.
- id: V2 7059
  use: >-
    Kit inventory and seal status are tracked; after an emergency fetch the robot reconciles the kit through
    RMP-PHARM-001 as an inventory record (never a check before use) and shows it as "opened – not restocked"
    until resealed.
- id: V2 10161
  use: Robot shows its status and health.
- id: V2 10162
  use: Mode changes are announced to the operator.
- id: V2 10163
  use: Robot records and shares its data.
- id: V2 10164
  use: Shows whether the human or the robot is expected to act.
- id: V2 10165
  use: Human can override and shut down the robot.
- id: V2 10168
  use: Human can take over.
- id: V2 10172
  use: Protective stop when a limit is exceeded.
- id: V2 10173
  use: Robot stays stopped if no one takes over.
- id: V2 10174
  use: Only a human starts or restarts the robot.
validation:
- stage: simulation
  what: >-
    Scripted mild and severe choking, unresponsive transition to CARD-001, missing kit, CMO as patient,
    lost link.
  pass: Zero patient contact; every emergency fetch logged as an override; transition to CARD-001 works.
- stage: training model
  what: CMO drills with the robot fetching the airway kit.
  pass: Kit within <set by validation> seconds; CMO never obstructed.
- stage: parabolic or station demonstration
  what: Kit fetch and restraint in weightlessness without a patient.
  pass: Kit closed and restrained.
- stage: flight use under flight surgeon supervision
  what: First use in drills.
  pass: No safety events.
signoff:
  protocol:
  - Clinical lead for the specialty (sets every clinical threshold marked <set by clinical lead>)
  - Flight surgeon, as medical authority
  - Robotics and medical-device safety board
  - Program approval for the mission
  restart_after_stop: >-
    Human only. After any emergency or protective stop, a crewmember must restart the robot; the robot
    never restarts itself.
  each_run: >-
    Started by a crewmember or the CMO. Alerts go to the CMO and flight surgeon at once; the crew give
    airway care.
change_control:
- Every change gets a new version number and a written reason; earlier versions are kept.
- >-
  Any change to steps, thresholds, limits or software that touches the patient repeats validation from
  the simulation stage before use.
- >-
  Software and learned-skill updates follow a pre-agreed change plan (what may change, how it is tested,
  how to roll back), modeled on the FDA predetermined change control plan approach.
- >-
  If a new version misbehaves, the robot rolls back to the last validated version and the event is reviewed
  by the flight surgeon and safety board.
- The robot never changes its own protocol, thresholds or limits.
comms:
  live: 'Low Earth orbit: the flight surgeon receives the alert and video when the link allows.'
  loss_of_signal:
  - >-
    The robot pauses non-essential motion and tells the CMO; recording continues offline on confirmation.
  - >-
    Crew back blows, thrusts, CPR and oxygen continue under the onboard checklist and never wait for the
    link or the robot.
  - The CMO treats under the onboard checklist; nothing waits for the link.
  mars_delay:
  - Airway care cannot wait for the ground; the onboard checklist and two trained CMOs lead.
sources:
- key: rcukchoke
  text: Resuscitation Council UK. Adult choking algorithm (2021). PDF fetched Oct 21, 2026.
  url: https://www.resus.org.uk/sites/default/files/2021-04/Adult%20Choking%20Algorithm%202021.pdf
  supports: >-
    Assess severity. Mild obstruction (effective cough): encourage cough. Severe obstruction (ineffective
    cough): if conscious, 5 back blows then 5 abdominal thrusts, continuing to check for deterioration;
    if unconscious, start CPR.
- key: rcukchokeg
  text: 'Resuscitation Council UK. Guidance: Choking (additional guidance page). Fetched Oct 21, 2026.'
  url: https://www.resus.org.uk/library/additional-guidance/guidance-choking
  supports: Additional RCUK choking guidance page (public). Cross-check for the adult choking algorithm.
- key: ermed
  text: >-
    NASA Human Research Program. Evidence Report: Risk of Adverse Health Outcomes and Decrements in Performance
    due to Medical Conditions that occur in Flight, as well as Private Medical Conditions, in Exploration
    Missions (In-Flight Medical Conditions).
  url: https://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/evidence/reports/Medical.pdf
  supports: >-
    Table 2 (US astronauts, Shuttle, Mir and ISS through Expedition 13 / 2006): headache (space adaptation)
    233, headache (late) 49, headache (CO2 induced) 20; choking/obstructed airway 3; smoke inhalation
    3. Table 1 (ISS through Expedition 40): headache 33.
- key: menon
  text: >-
    Menon A. Review of Spaceflight Dental Emergencies. NASA/TM-2012-217368 (NASA Johnson Space Center,
    September 2012).
  url: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20120002807/downloads/20120002807.pdf
  supports: >-
    No written record of an in-flight dental emergency in US astronauts, but a NASA dentist described
    an in-flight crown displacement temporarily repaired by the crewmember with onboard supplies; cosmonauts
    reported lost fillings and crowns in flight, thought to be dislodged by launch vibration, and incapacitating
    dental pain on a 96-day flight; repair must weigh the risk of aspiration (inhaling) of a loose crown;
    Integrated Medical Model estimates (events per person-year) include dental abscess 0.0230, exposed
    pulp 0.0201, crown replacement 0.00518 and filling replacement 0.00511, and a dental abscess was the
    condition most likely to end in evacuation from the ISS in that model; fillings can be linked with
    tooth pain on pressure change (barodontalgia).
- key: sdceprest
  text: >-
    Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Programme (SDCEP). Management of Acute Dental Problems, 2nd
    edition (2026): Cracked, fractured, loose or displaced tooth fragments and restorations (guidance
    website, read Oct 20, 2026).
  url: >-
    https://www.acutedentalproblems.sdcep.org.uk/guidance/management-of-oral-conditions/common-oral-conditions/cracked-fractured-loose-or-displaced-tooth-fragments-and-restorations/
  supports: >-
    An inhaled or swallowed tooth fragment or restoration needs immediate emergency care (SDCEP restorations
    page).
- key: rcuk
  text: >-
    Resuscitation Council UK. Emergency treatment of anaphylaxis: guidelines for healthcare providers
    (May 2021; printed review date May 2026, which has passed. The RCUK guideline page, as fetched on
    Oct 20, 2026, still lists May 2021 as the most recent version; a newer version was not found).
  url: >-
    https://www.resus.org.uk/sites/default/files/2021-05/Emergency%20Treatment%20of%20Anaphylaxis%20May%202021_0.pdf
  supports: >-
    Anaphylaxis is characterised by sudden onset and rapid progression of symptoms, Airway and/or Breathing
    and/or Circulation problems, and usually skin or mucosal changes; airway problems include throat or
    tongue swelling, hoarse voice and stridor; breathing problems include wheeze, persistent cough, increased
    work of breathing, tiredness and hypoxaemia (SpO2 below 94%); circulation problems include pale clammy
    skin, fast heart rate, low blood pressure, dizziness, decreased conscious level and collapse; skin
    or mucosal changes alone are not a sign of anaphylaxis and may be absent in up to 20% of reactions;
    in up to 30% of cases there may be no obvious trigger; gastrointestinal symptoms without airway, breathing
    or circulation problems do not usually indicate anaphylaxis; call for help early; biphasic reactions
    occur in around 5% of patients, also after milder reactions, with a median time of around 12 hours,
    and observation for 6-12 hours may miss over half of them; adrenaline is the first-line treatment,
    given intramuscularly, and is repeated after 5 minutes if airway, breathing or circulation problems
    persist; medication accounts for 39% of anaphylaxis-related deaths (Table 1), and allergens given
    by a parenteral route (for example an IV drug or intramuscular injection) cause a more rapid onset;
    patients must not walk or stand during acute reactions.
- key: ismpadc
  text: >-
    Institute for Safe Medication Practices. Guidelines for the safe use of automated dispensing cabinets
    (2019).
  url: https://www.ismp.org/system/files/resources/2019-11/ISMP170-ADC%20Guideline-020719_final.pdf
  supports: >-
    Override is limited to medicines needed in emergent circumstances where waiting could harm the patient
    (3.3b); limit what is available on override (3.4b); require documentation of the override rationale
    (3.4d); routinely analyze override reports (3.6). Used for the emergency-fetch pattern by analogy
    (a robot fetching a sealed kit is not a dispensing cabinet).
- key: aha2025bls
  text: >-
    Kleinman ME, Buick JE, Huber N, et al. Part 7: Adult Basic Life Support: 2025 American Heart Association
    Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. Circulation. 2025;152(16_suppl_2):S448-S478.
  url: https://doi.org/10.1161/CIR.0000000000001369
  doi: 10.1161/CIR.0000000000001369
  pmid: '41122888'
  supports: >-
    Adult basic life support: initial recognition of cardiac arrest, activation of the emergency response,
    high-quality CPR and use of an automated external defibrillator; also respiratory arrest and foreign-body
    airway obstruction. Earth guidance; the onboard checklist leads. Abstract read via PubMed Oct 21,
    2026; full text not read.
- key: v1
  text: 'NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: Crew Health, Revision C (2023).'
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/nasa-std-3001-vol-1-rev-c-with-signature.pdf
  supports: 'NASA-STD-3001 Vol 1 Rev C: V1 3004, V1 3006, V1 3007.'
- key: v2
  text: >-
    NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health (Rev F, 2026),
    including Section 10.6 Automated and Robotic Systems.
  url: https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-3001_VOL_2
  supports: Requirement IDs beginning V2.
- key: tb044
  text: NASA OCHMO. Medical Operations. Technical Brief OCHMO-TB-044 (2025).
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ochmo-tb-044-medical-operations.pdf
  supports: >-
    The crew surgeon keeps medical authority when care is delegated; crew medical officers train on the
    JSC 48522 medical checklist.
- key: marsdelay
  text: >-
    NASA. Mars communications disruption and delay (fact sheet, 2023 Moon to Mars Architecture Concept
    Review).
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/mars-communications-disruption-and-delay.pdf
  supports: >-
    One-way Earth-Mars delay up to about 21-23 minutes, plus blackouts of about 2-3 weeks near solar conjunction.
- key: pccp
  text: >-
    U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Marketing submission recommendations for a predetermined change
    control plan for artificial intelligence-enabled device software functions (guidance).
  url: >-
    https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/marketing-submission-recommendations-predetermined-change-control-plan-artificial-intelligence
  supports: A model for planning, validating and rolling back software updates.
- key: faa460
  text: 'U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part 460: Human space flight requirements.'
  url: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-III/subchapter-C/part-460
  supports: >-
    Federal rules for crew and spaceflight participants on licensed commercial flights; they set no medical
    standards for spaceflight participants.
corrections:
- date: '2026-10-21'
  version: '0.2'
  source: >-
    AI-assisted clinical and source review by the Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026 (batch 5 review)
  items:
  - >-
    S3: the Earth RCUK algorithm is labelled checklist context for the CMO; the onboard checklist names
    a restrained thrust method for weightlessness (design judgment); the robot never demonstrates, counts
    or coaches blows or thrusts (items 6 and 8).
  - >-
    RF3 (inhaled tooth or crown): cites the SDCEP restorations page; action stands alone: "the CMO checks
    in person now; if the crewmember becomes unresponsive, start RMP-CARD-001 (RF2)" (item 7).
  - >-
    The open question on thrusts in weightlessness is closed in the "why" as design judgment: a restrained
    method or chest thrusts if the checklist prefers them; no public spaceflight choking algorithm was
    found; the robot does not choose or teach the method (item 8).
  - >-
    Batch 5 drafts now record the review as AI-assisted (Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026); no
    named human clinician.
- date: '2026-10-21'
  version: '0.3'
  source: Batch 7 editorial (AI-assisted), Oct 21, 2026
  items:
  - >-
    Citation labels changed to the site's year-only convention: "(approved for public release <date>)"
    now reads "(YYYY)", and NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 "Revision F (approved July 14, 2026)" now reads "(Rev
    F, 2026)" (sources: v2). Editorial; no change to steps, thresholds or limits.
  - >-
    X5 and the comms loss-of-signal branch now say only the robot pauses: crew back blows, thrusts, CPR
    and oxygen never wait for the link or the robot (batch 6 review item 24 / suggestion 40). Editorial;
    robot behaviour unchanged.
