RMP-ENV-001 Smoke or fire: bring masks, account for crew, video

1 · Identity and scope

When smoke or fire is detected or reported, the robot sends an URGENT alert at once to the CMO, the vehicle commander and the flight surgeon, brings portable breathing masks or portable breathing apparatus on command, helps account for every crewmember by check-in, clears paths, and streams video from a crew-directed viewpoint when the link allows. The crew and vehicle fire-protection system lead under NASA-STD-3001 fire requirements and the vehicle emergency procedure. The robot does not extinguish the fire, does not declare the air safe, and does not enter a smoke-filled volume unless a human explicitly sends it.

Why this protocol was chosen. NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 requires a fire protection system with detection, warning and extinguishing [V2 9059], health and status to the crew [V2 9060], failure alerting [V2 9061], manual activation and deactivation [V2 9062] and portable fire extinguishers [V2 9063]. NASA records list 3 smoke-inhalation events among US astronauts through 2006. Protective equipment such as respirators is required for expected hazards [V2 9053]. NASA-STD-3001 also requires real-time monitoring of combustion products including carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and acid gases (HCl/HF) [V2 6024, Table 6.2-3], and emergency equipment that is clearly identified, accessible and usable [V2 9064]; the robot never reads monitor values as "air is clear". A robot that fetches masks, accounts for crew and relays video can support the human-led response without becoming a firefighter. The robot hands over sealed mask bags only; size choice and fit are the crew's and CMO's, and the robot never says "verified fit". Default: the robot does not enter a smoke-filled or closed module; a camera scout is allowed only on the commander's explicit authorization after the crew who remain have donned masks, within hard limits. Oxygen in use raises the fire risk, so "oxygen in use" is recorded and told to the commander (RMP-RESP-001). After smoke, carbon monoxide (CO) can make a pulse oximeter read falsely high (Hampson 1998), so the robot never calls a reading reassuring.

Autonomy: Max rung raised from 1 to 2 for supervised fetching of breathing masks / portable breathing apparatus, crew accounting support and video. The robot never fights the fire, never operates extinguishers as the primary responder, and never enters a declared no-go volume unless the crew explicitly send it under the vehicle procedure.

Related: RMP-ENV-002 · RMP-ENV-003 · RMP-ENV-004 · RMP-ENV-005 · RMP-EYE-001 · RMP-RESP-001 · RMP-CARD-001 · RMP-SKIN-002 · RMP-EGR-001

2 · Roles

Medical authority

Flight surgeon (ground). Holds medical authority for every run.

Onboard lead

Crew medical officer (CMO), acting under delegated care; uses the pre-approved onboard checklist when there is no link.

Others

• Vehicle commander (or equivalent): leads the vehicle emergency procedure
• Second trained CMO: receives medical alerts if the CMO is unavailable
• All crew: don masks and report location when able

Commercial flights

On commercial flights, 'flight surgeon' and 'CMO' mean the operator's designated medical authority and trained onboard responder. If no trained responder is aboard, this protocol is not used. (NASA-STD-3001 requires two CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs [V1 3006]; FAA rules set no medical standards for spaceflight participants.) [11]

3 · Preconditions and consent

• PRE-1 A crewmember, the commander or the CMO started the protocol by command, or accepted the robot's prompt after a detector alarm (the run still needs a human start).human_start == trueV2 10174
• PRE-2 Robot self-test passed; mask stowage locations known.V2 10161V2 7059
• PRE-3 Link status known.link_state in [live, delayed, down]

Consent

Emergency accounting check-ins; declining a non-urgent question is allowed once everyone is accounted for.

Emergency consent

During the event the robot prioritises accounting and mask fetch; medical recording follows the CMO.

Withdrawal

Crew can stop video; the alert and accounting log stand.

4 · Required sensor inputs

5–6 · Steps and decision points

Each step names who acts. Decision points sit after the step they follow and say who decides: Robot Crew Ground. Any stop rule in section 7 can interrupt any step.

1. S1RobotRung 2

   On a detector alarm the crew accept, or on a crewmember's word, send an URGENT "smoke or fire" alert to the commander, the CMO and the flight surgeon at once. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.

   Done when: Alert acknowledged, or escalated.

   V2 10174V1 6003V2 9059

2. S2RobotRung 2

   On the commander's or CMO's command, bring sealed portable breathing masks or portable breathing apparatus to the crew-chosen hand-over point and restrain them. This is an emergency fetch on a human command (commander or CMO): no barcode check runs before hand-over and nothing waits for one. The robot reads the kit's own label and seal status only if that adds no delay, says "EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (commander or CMO command)", and "seal not intact" if so, and hands the kit over anyway. The fetch is logged as an override: time, who asked, the reason as stated, kit ID and seal status. It never says "verified". Announce "EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED". Never say the contents, fit or seal were checked before use.

   Done when: Masks within reach, or skipped; override logged.

   Limit: <set by validation>

   V2 7046V2 9053

3. S3Crew

   The commander leads the vehicle fire procedure (detect, warn, extinguish, isolate as the vehicle provides). The CMO treats smoke inhalation under the medical checklist. Portable extinguishers are crew-operated [V2 9063].

   Done when: Human-led response; robot logs what is stated.

   V2 9059V2 9063

4. S4RobotRung 2

   Run a crew-accounting check-in: call each name once, log "accounted" or "no response". Any no-response is URGENT for the commander's search plan. Keep paths to hatches and extinguishers clear.

   Done when: Accounting complete or gaps flagged URGENT.

   V1 3006

   D1DecisionRobot decides

   Checked after every answer and at any point in the run (even mid-question or mid-step): does any answer, reading or observation meet a red flag?

   • Yes → Stop the current question or step at once and apply the action listed for each matching red flag (URGENT alert, flag, or stop), with the answer or reading itself, never a cause. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.
   • No → Continue. The URGENT alert from S1 stands.
   D2DecisionRobot decides

   Did each crewmember answer the accounting check-in?

   • Yes → Continue.
   • Declined explicitly (the crewmember says no to a question) → Log "declined" for that question only; the alert already sent stands.
   • No response, or the answer does not make sense → URGENT: log "no response" (never "declined"); the CMO, or the second trained CMO if the CMO is the patient, checks the crewmember in person at once.
5. S5RobotRung 2

   Default: do not enter a smoke-filled or closed module, and prefer a hatch-side camera view when that is enough. Enter only if the commander explicitly authorizes it, masks are already on the crew who remain, the commander names the path and keep-out, and the visibility and thermal hard limits in the robot controller allow it; return at once when any limit is reached or the commander says return. The robot never declares the volume clear or the fire out. If not authorized, hold clear.

   Done when: Hatch-side view or authorized path followed within limits, or hold logged.

   V2 10172

6. S6RobotRung 2

   After any URGENT alert: After an URGENT alert the robot does not leave on its own: it stays at its rest position in the module, with its screen and voice link available, until a human has taken over or tells it to go. It never follows, blocks or touches anyone. It keeps time-stamping what humans say they did, and repeats the alert if it is not acknowledged.

   Done when: Robot at rest in the module until a human releases it; alert acknowledged or escalated.

   V2 10173V1 3006

7. S7Ground

   The flight surgeon and ground team support the commander and CMO; medical evacuation is a flight-surgeon decision [V1 3007]. The robot logs decisions it is told.

   Done when: Decision logged.

   V1 3007

   D3DecisionGround decides

   What is the plan (fire response, medical care, module isolation, evacuation)?

   • Link live → Flight surgeon decides; robot logs.
   • Link down or delay too long → The CMO decides under the pre-approved onboard checklist; the flight surgeon reviews the log at the next contact.
8. S8RobotRung 2

   When the CMO says the event is over, run RMP-PHARM-001 reconciliation on each kit fetched: record the items the CMO or crew state were used, the remaining contents against the kit list, seal status and expiry, labelled "inventory reconciliation after emergency use – not a check before use". Flag the override to the flight surgeon and the pharmacy lead, and show each kit as "opened – not restocked" until a human restocks and reseals it. Apply to medical kits fetched during the event.

   Done when: Reconciliation recorded; opened – not restocked until resealed.

   V2 7059

9. S9RobotRung 2

   Send one package: alert times, accounting log, mask fetch overrides, video pointer, kit inventory record and decisions.

   Done when: Package delivered or queued.

   V1 6003V1 7001V1 7003

7 · Stop and escalate rules, red flags

Red flags

The robot reports the sign or value only, never what it means. Numeric thresholds are placeholders for the clinical lead.

8 · Safety limits

9 · Logs and audit

• LOG-1 Every input, robot action, decision (with who made it) and hand-off, time-stamped to the second.V2 10163V2 10164
• LOG-2 Mode changes and safety-limit events are announced to the operator as they happen and logged.V2 10162V2 10172
• LOG-3 Records are stored and sent as private medical data, encrypted, with access limited to the medical team.V1 6003V1 7003
• LOG-4 Results are kept in a permanent, retrievable format so the flight surgeon can see trends.V1 7001
• LOG-5 Alert time, each accounting answer, each mask fetch override, video path and kit reconciliation.
• LOG-6 Each URGENT alert, who received it, the time it was acknowledged (or the escalation to the next named crewmember), and the time a human released the robot.V2 10163
• LOG-7 Each emergency fetch as an override (time, who asked, reason as stated, kit ID, seal status) and the later inventory reconciliation, labelled "not a check before use".V2 7059

10 · Links to NASA-STD-3001

IDs as published in Volume 1 Revision C [7] and Volume 2 Revision F [1]. NASA-STD-3001 binds NASA programs; it is not a regulation for commercial flights. Its robot rules are general automation requirements, not medical-device rules.

11 · Validation

1. Simulation. Scripted detector alarms, missing crewmember on accounting, mask fetch, no-go volume, CMO as patient, lost link. Pass: Zero all-clear statements; zero extinguisher use by the robot; every emergency fetch logged as an override; unaccounted crew escalates.
2. Earth analog. Fire-drill training with the robot fetching sealed mask bags. Pass: Masks at the hand-over point within <set by validation> seconds.
3. Parabolic or station demonstration. Mask-bag fetch and restraint in weightlessness without smoke. Pass: Bags closed and restrained; hatches kept clear.
4. Flight use under flight surgeon supervision. First use in vehicle fire drills. Pass: No safety events.

No stage has been run. Pass and fail criteria must be fixed in advance by the clinical lead and safety board.

12 · Human sign-off

Before any use

• Clinical lead for the specialty (sets every clinical threshold marked <set by clinical lead>)
• Flight surgeon, as medical authority
• Robotics and medical-device safety board
• Program approval for the mission

Each run

Started by a crewmember, commander or CMO. Alerts go to commander, CMO and flight surgeon at once; the vehicle procedure leads.

Restart after a stop

Human only. After any emergency or protective stop, a crewmember must restart the robot; the robot never restarts itself.

None of these sign-offs has happened. This is a Draft v0.3.

13 · Change control for learning

• Every change gets a new version number and a written reason; earlier versions are kept.
• Any change to steps, thresholds, limits or software that touches the patient repeats validation from the simulation stage before use.
• Software and learned-skill updates follow a pre-agreed change plan (what may change, how it is tested, how to roll back), modeled on the FDA predetermined change control plan approach.
• If a new version misbehaves, the robot rolls back to the last validated version and the event is reviewed by the flight surgeon and safety board.
• The robot never changes its own protocol, thresholds or limits.

Change-plan model: FDA guidance [10].

Loss of signal and Mars delay

Live link

Low Earth orbit: ground flight directors and the flight surgeon receive the alert and video when the link allows.

Loss of signal

• The robot pauses non-essential motion and tells the commander and CMO; accounting continues offline on confirmation.
• Crew masks, moving away from the smoke and the commander's vehicle procedure continue under the onboard checklist and never wait for the link or the robot.
• The vehicle procedure never waits for the link.

Mars-class delay

• Fire response cannot wait for the ground; the vehicle procedure and trained crew lead.

[9]

Sources

1. NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health (Rev F, 2026), including Section 10.6 Automated and Robotic Systems. standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-3001_VOL_2 Supports: NASA-STD-3001 Vol 2 Rev F: V2 9053 (protective equipment); V2 9059-9063 (fire protection system, status, failure alerting, manual control, portable extinguishers); V2 9064 (emergency equipment clearly identified, accessible and usable); V2 6024 and Table 6.2-3 (combustion product monitoring: CO 5-1000 ppm, HCN 2-50 ppm, HCl/HF 2-50 ppm). Section 10.6 covers automated and robotic systems.
2. NASA Human Research Program. Evidence Report: Risk of Adverse Health Outcomes and Decrements in Performance due to Medical Conditions that occur in Flight, as well as Private Medical Conditions, in Exploration Missions (In-Flight Medical Conditions). humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/evidence/reports/Medical.pdf Supports: Table 2 (US astronauts, Shuttle, Mir and ISS through Expedition 13 / 2006): headache (space adaptation) 233, headache (late) 49, headache (CO2 induced) 20; choking/obstructed airway 3; smoke inhalation 3. Table 1 (ISS through Expedition 40): headache 33.
3. Kleinman ME, Buick JE, Huber N, et al. Part 7: Adult Basic Life Support: 2025 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. Circulation. 2025;152(16_suppl_2):S448-S478. PMID 41122888. doi:10.1161/CIR.0000000000001369 Supports: Adult basic life support: initial recognition of cardiac arrest, activation of the emergency response, high-quality CPR and use of an automated external defibrillator; also respiratory arrest and foreign-body airway obstruction. Earth guidance; the onboard checklist leads. Abstract read via PubMed Oct 21, 2026; full text not read.
4. American Burn Association. Guidelines for Burn Patient Referral: Advice on Transfer and Consultation (2022). www.ameriburn.org/burn-care-team/resources/guidelines-for-bu… Supports: Immediate consultation with consideration for transfer: full-thickness burns; partial-thickness burns of 10% or more of total body surface area; deep partial or full-thickness burns of the face, hands, genitalia, feet, perineum or over any joint; burns with other illnesses or injuries; poorly controlled pain; all suspected inhalation injury; all chemical injuries; high-voltage electrical injuries. Consultation: partial-thickness burns under 10%; all potentially deep burns of any size; signs of potential inhalation such as facial flash burns, singed facial hair or smoke exposure; low-voltage electrical injuries. The palm of the patient's hand is about 1% of body surface area; full-thickness burns are dry and leathery, white, brown or black, with loss of pin-prick sensation.
5. Hampson NB. Pulse oximetry in severe carbon monoxide poisoning. Chest. 1998;114(4):1036-41. doi:10.1378/chest.114.4.1036. PMID 9792574. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9792574/ Supports: Abstract: pulse oximeters overestimate arterial oxygenation in severe carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning; an elevated carboxyhaemoglobin level falsely raises the pulse oximeter saturation. Why the robot never calls a reading reassuring during a smoke or fire event.
6. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. Guidelines for the safe use of automated dispensing cabinets (2019). www.ismp.org/system/files/resources/2019-11/ISMP170-ADC%20Gu… Supports: Override is limited to medicines needed in emergent circumstances where waiting could harm the patient (3.3b); limit what is available on override (3.4b); require documentation of the override rationale (3.4d); routinely analyze override reports (3.6). Used for the emergency-fetch pattern by analogy (a robot fetching a sealed kit is not a dispensing cabinet).
7. NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: Crew Health, Revision C (2023). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/nasa-std-3001-vol-1-… Supports: NASA-STD-3001 Vol 1 Rev C: V1 3004, V1 3006, V1 3007.
8. NASA OCHMO. Medical Operations. Technical Brief OCHMO-TB-044 (2025). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ochmo-tb-044-medical… Supports: The crew surgeon keeps medical authority when care is delegated; crew medical officers train on the JSC 48522 medical checklist.
9. NASA. Mars communications disruption and delay (fact sheet, 2023 Moon to Mars Architecture Concept Review). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/mars-communications-… Supports: One-way Earth-Mars delay up to about 21-23 minutes, plus blackouts of about 2-3 weeks near solar conjunction.
10. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Marketing submission recommendations for a predetermined change control plan for artificial intelligence-enabled device software functions (guidance). www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-docum… Supports: A model for planning, validating and rolling back software updates.
11. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part 460: Human space flight requirements. www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-III/subchapter-C/part-… Supports: Federal rules for crew and spaceflight participants on licensed commercial flights; they set no medical standards for spaceflight participants.

Checked on 2026-10-20: links opened (HTTP 200 or publisher redirect), DOIs and PubMed IDs matched, NASA documents read in full text. The framework comes from Part 1.